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통일 한국 초기단계에서 미국의 대한반도 경제협력:기회와 제약=US strategic and economic cooperation in an early stage of a hypothetical Korean reunification: opportunities and constraints

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Our assignment in this paper is to consider the question of “management under temporary separation and international cooperation after Korean unification”: more specifically, to examine “U.S. strategy for economic cooperation with unified Korea, particularly with a focus on investment in North Korea” (and, to the extent feasible, the) “prospects of changes in East Asian value chain after Korean unification: from the U.S.’s perspective”.
  The basic assumptions about the nature of the hypothetical future re-unification for this exercise are laid out as follows: Of the many scenarios of Korea’s unification, this research project will focus on the “compromising scenario” which is a scenario that has achieved political unification through governmental negotiations but have not yet begun full-fledged economic integration. Economic integration in this case will be a gradual process.
  This scenario involves one political and economic system (market capitalism), but will have two separate economic units (North and South) which eventually is expected to reach full integration. Initially there will be integration of the commodities market and capital market (1ststage) then there will be labor market integration (2nd stage), then adaptation of a common currency (3rd stage), which will gradually reach full integration into a single market.
  This project will focus on the 1st stage of this process, where we assume an integration of the commodities and capital market, but not yet labor market integration or a unified currency.
  In this paper we will propose an alternative method for attempting to quantify economic performance for the DPRK?and by extension, for a future northern Korea in a re-unified peninsula. This is based upon an approach of modeling economic performance on the basis of international datafiles which do include estimates of North Korean socioeconomic conditions. This approach seems to produce generally robust results, and affords a novel method for estimating possible macroeconomic performance and international trade and financial performance for a northern Korea in a re-unified peninsula. Developing this model and presenting its results is the main contribution of this paper.
  Many different future re-unification scenarios for North Korea can be envisioned, and indeed have been in some detail by researchers and policymakers: these include the possibility of a regime collapse, an internal upheaval and “implosion”, or an end to regime resulting from an attack against the South (“explosion”). Reviewing the framing stipulations for the nature of the re-unification for this exercise, one is tempted to observe these conditions look to be the very most convenient from the standpoint of South Korean policymakers. At the same time, however, they all look to be exceedingly unlikely to concord with reality in the event of an actual re-unification of the peninsula. Yet even under our putative “best of all possible worlds” scenario, there would be serious “transition risks” bearing on economic performance in post-unification northern Korea. It is notable that virtually all these uncertainties would make for poorer performance than we might otherwise expect against our baseline.
  In this monograph we model “the economic growth of nations”?postwar economic performance, including international economic performance, for a large sample of countries?solely on the basis of human resource inputs and the quality of policy/institutions. This approach to estimating and predicting macroeconomic and international economic performance is new. Models attempting to explain and predict economic performance at the national level on the basis of human resource qualities and human societal/organizational arrangements alone are as yet not part of the economic literature.
  To date the main approach to estimating the North Korean economy’s quantitative performance has been with physical indicators, drawing on physical indicator-to-value added relationships from a limited number of other countries (or sometimes just a single country, South Korea, from earlier decades). Our approach offers a very different theoretical narrative?one explaining economic output entirely in terms of human resources and social arrangements, rather than inanimate inputs?and a truly global international context.
  The results from our simple approach to modeling are striking: on the whole, they are powerful, robust, and stable. We appear to have uncovered deep and statistically meaningful relationships from these panel data for postwar relationships between human resources and the quality of institution and polices on the one hand and economic performance?in terms of per capita output levels, trade volume, and levels of foreign domestic investment stock?on the other. We use lagged independent variables to estimate dependent variables 10 years later. By this same process we can estimate notional economic performance for northern Korea ten years after a notional Korean re-unification (U+10). For our purpose in this paper we illustrate estimates for U=10 based on the assumption that unification took place in 2015?using alternative assumptions for initial “business climate” in northern Korea.
  Will the United States be willing to commit to the sorts of strategic and economic efforts that would promote the chance for a successful Korean re-unification?especially to the sorts of measures that would be most helpful in the early stages of such a re-unification? At this writing, there may be more uncertainty about the answer to this question than at any time since the world awaited President Truman’s response to the North Korean invasion of the South in June 1950. The immediate reason for this uncertainty is the inauguration of President Donald J. Trump?a very new type of American President, with seemingly very different ideas about America’s role in the world from any of his postwar predecessors, Democrat or Republican.
  This is not to say that the new Trump Administration might not embrace “liberal internationalist” style policy choices concerning Korean re-unification at the moment of truth. The plain fact, however, is that the new Administration’s potential approach to this question is much less clear and much less predictable than for any American President in the living memory of most readers.
  This new uncertainty about America’s commitment to liberal internationalism?to the international architecture, in other words, that the United States itself was instrumental in designing after World War II?did not entirely commence with the Trump Presidency. It is a classic case of “domestic bases of foreign policy”?and as such it has been gathering slowly, and for some time.
  Just how the American approach to a prospective Korean re-unification will play out under the influence of these new and unfamiliar populist tides remains to be seen. Winston Churchill famously remarked that Americans could be relied upon to do the right thing?after they had exhausted all other alternatives. Perhaps?but for now, convincing America to do “the right thing” with respect to Korean re-unification in its early stages looks to be a considerably harder sell than would have been the case just a few years ago.[轉錄自KIEP]


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